Integrity in Organizations
© 1995, McGaw-Hill International (UK) Ltd, ISBN 0 07 709136 1
Orthodox business ethics has failed. It only fuels sterile academic debate and delivers nothing of value to practical managers.
Integrity in Organizations provides an alternative based on how leading businesses actually handle ethical issues. Instead of theorising about how Plato or Aristotle, or even Kant, might have analysed a situation, Integrity in Organizations examines what leading firms of the 1990s actually do about ethics.
Lots of practical examples are given together with a totally new look at the theory on which they are based. The book asks different ethical questions and provides excitingly different answers and, at least, promises to help managers build integrity into their own organizations.
Integrity in Organizations provides a completely new and practical focus for the development of training and education in business ethics as well as providing a provocative and stimulating individual read for practitioners.
It provokes managers to view their business with a fresh perspective, presenting the idea of an organization as a complex web of networks requiring an informed overview of business strategic interests, alongside appropriate levels of integrity.
‘There has always been a natural tension between behaviour which is broadly accepted as being ethical, and the imperatives of a successful business. … businesses need to be recognised as suitable or desirable partners in the mutually advantageous collaborations and alliances on which businesses increasingly depend.’
‘The most effective way of building enlightened self-interest into a firm is to deliberately inculcate a system of corporate values into all stakeholders. The value free starting point is important. It needs to be recognized that this is not a sentimental approach to ethics, but a deliberately hardnosed business approach … it is possible to identify the actions necessary to achieve this high integrity culture as a result of dispassionate analysis, rather than as the imperatives of a fervently held, but possibly idiosyncratic system of personal morality.’